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AFTER AUTONOMY 
Carl E. Schneider' 
To rest upon a formula is a slumber that, prolonged, means 
death. 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 
Ideals and Doubts 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The communists ... are on the one hand, practically, the most 
advanced and resolute section of the working-class parties of 
every country, that section which pushes forward all others; on 
the other hand, theoretically, they have over the great mass of 
the proletariat the advantage of clearly understanding the line 
of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general results of the 
proletarian movement. 
Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels 
The Communist Manifesto 
Bioethicists1 today are like Bolsheviks on the death of Lenin. 
· Chauncey Stillman Professor of Law and Professor of Internal 
Medicine, University of Michigan. I am grateful to the editors of the Wake 
Forest Law Review for bravely and generously permitting me to abandon the 
conventions of law review editing. They have duly pointed out the errors of 
form and style that you are about to encounter, and I cheerfully relieve them of 
all responsibility for every solecism. For a justification of my willfulness and an 
invitation to my colleagues to join me in it, see Carl E. Schneider, The Book 
Review Issue: An Owner's Manual, 96 Michigan L Rev 1383 (1998). For the 
reasons given in Richard A Posner, Goodbye to the Bluebook, 53 U Chicago L 
Rev 1343 (1986), I follow the University of Chicago Manual of Legal Citation 
(Lawyers Co-operative, 1989). 
From first to last, Mark Hall has been the but-for cause of this essay. I 
proffer him all the thanks at my command, provided that he pass her fair share 
on to Diana. It is also a pleasure to thank the participants in the Wake Forest 
workshop for their perceptive comments on this essay. Rebecca Dresser was 
specifically assigned to comment on it, and she showed yet again why she is one 
of the most valuable and admirable people in bioethics. 
1. I need a shorthand word for a varied group. So by bioethicists I mean 
people who practice and write about bioethics generally, people who write about 
the legal regulation of bioethical issues, and people who write such regulations. 
This group obviously varies from category to category and within categories. 
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They have, rather to their surprise, won the day. Their principle of 
autonomy is dogma. Their era of charismatic leadership is over. 
Their work of Weberian rationalization, of institutionalizing 
principle and party, has begun. The liturgy is reverently recited, 
but the vitality of Lenin's "What Is To Be Done?" has yielded to the 
vacuity of Stalin's "The Foundations of Leninism." Effort once 
lavished on expounding ideology is now devoted to establishing 
associations, organizing degree programs, installing bioethicist 
commissars in every hospital, and staffing IRB soviets. Not-so-
secret police prowl the libraries hunting counter-revolutionaries and 
other wreckers; anxious academics denounce deviationist colleagues. 
A field once comprising diverse people from diverse backgrounds 
with diverse perspectives is increasingly populated by standard 
academics with standard academic opinions. 
Nevertheless, the samizdat literature persistently asserts that 
the policy of autonomy is betraying its promise. Explication of the 
autonomy principle is becoming repetitive and arid. Programs 
always need one more revision, one more Five Year Plan, before 
they can actually begin to work. Life in the vanguard of the 
(patient) proletariat grows irksome when the proletariat is so balky 
and ungrateful. Surely somewhere the next great bioethical idea is 
slouching toward Moscow to be born. 
The bioethical apparat, of course, insists that the only cure for 
the ills of autonomy is more autonomy. The apparat not only 
reiterates the principle; it has raised the stakes in two ways. First, 
as it has become undeniable that in area after area patients remain 
far from making genuinely autonomous decisions, the list of things 
doctors, hospitals, and researchers must do if they are really and 
truly to honor patients' autonomy grows and grows. One modest 
proposal, for instance, demands that patients be told not only the 
benefits and risks of proposed treatments but also imagines that 
(take a deep breath): 
(1) "Providers" should undertake an "in-depth exploration" of 
patients' "affective and cognitive processes." 
(2) Providers should "explore uncertainties and limitations 
both in the provider's own knowledge and in the state of the 
science." 
(3) "[P]roviders must understand and disclose their own 
motivations, beliefs, and values to patients." 
(4) "[P]roviders ought to explore what kind of role 
Academic bioethicists range from quite sophisticated to quite dogmatic. Clinical 
bioethicists tend more toward the rustic. Courts, legislatures, and agencies can 
seem hardly subtler. See Marsha Garrison & Carl E. Schneider, The Law of 
Bioethics: Individual Autonomy and Social Regulation (West, 2002). 
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expectations [about how decisions should be made] the patient 
has for herself and her provider." 
(5) "[I]nformed consent ought to be individualized ... and 
take place in the context of an ongoing relationship with a 
trusted health care provider."2 
413 
In what world could all this happen? And in that world, would 
patients then make autonomous decisions? 
The second way the stakes are being raised for the autonomy 
principle is by the gradual acceptance of "mandatory autonomy." 
This is the idea that patients not only are entitled to make their own 
decisions but have an ethical or social duty to do so.3 In its most 
robust form, mandatory autonomy still has relatively few avowed 
proponents, but increasingly potent versions of it increasingly 
appear in the writings not just of bioethicists, but also of doctors and 
patients (and, floridly, in the medical students I teach).4 
Yet between the idea and the reality falls the shadow. Even 
while the apparat raises the stakes for autonomy, discontent with 
its predominance proliferates. No one rejects autonomy entirely, but 
at the level of theory two criticisms are now long standing. The first 
criticism acknowledges the value of the principle but suggests that 
competing principles are too regularly scanted. (And now abideth 
beneficence, social justice, and autonomy, these three; but the 
greatest of these is autonomy.) The second criticism contends that 
the autonomy principle, while estimable and essential, promotes 
deleterious attitudes, perhaps principally by underwriting a 
corrosive individualism that alienates people from their family, 
friends, and physicians. 
These criticisms are apt, but they hardly relieve the suffocating 
hegemony of the autonomy principle. That principle is too well 
entrenched, and the criticisms offer no substitute for it, much less a 
substitute with ready appeal. They do not even offer satisfying 
complements to it. The criticisms acknowledge the necessity of the 
autonomy principle and only want to confine it to its proper sphere. 
Yet what is that sphere and how should autonomy be modulated and 
offset by other principles? Little can be said in the abstract; little 
gets said in concrete cases. 
The problem is not just intellectual; it is political. Bioethics was 
born a reform movement and adamantly remains one. It is a 
movement with an enemy-medical imperialism. Such movements 
welcome intellectuals only as long as they are politically useful; they 
2. Gail Geller et al, "Decoding" Informed Consent: Insights from Women 
Regarding Breast Cancer Susceptibility Testing, Hastings Center Report 28 
(March/Aprill997). 
3. I investigate this idea at length in The Practice of Autonomy: Patients, 
Doctors, and Medical Decisions (Oxford U Press, 1998). 
4. This idea too I explore at length ibid. 
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loathe renegades. He that is not with me is against me: and he that 
gathereth not with me scattereth. And the autonomy principle is a 
political symbol as well as the fons et origo of the faith. Concessions 
on matters of symbol are dangerous. 
It is time for glasnost. No field should go for decades without 
rigorous self-scrutiny, and bioethics has been oddly incurious about 
itself. But how do we make self-examination productive? Many 
approaches are necessary, no single one suffices, if only because the 
field is such a patchwork of subjects, disciplines, and problems. 
Here I want to suggest one starting point. Bioethics may be the 
study of ethical problems, but bioethicists have always wanted to 
shape public policy. If that is the goal of bioethics, the first step in 
evaluating it is to ask whether bioethical policy is successful. 
Wherefore by their fruits ye shall know them. 
But how are we to evaluate bioethical policies? There is a 
standard answer to this question--do the programs' benefits exceed 
their cost? This is a question I can hardly remember a bioethicist 
posing. For example, bioethics was born insisting that researchers 
regularly abused their subjects. The solution was the IRB. Today, 
thousands-tens of thousands?--of people whose time is ruinously 
expensive spend hundreds of thousands-millions?--of hours 
reviewing thousands and thousands of research proposals. How 
many ethically intolerable proposals are caught, and how many 
make it through the gauntlet? How many useful and harmless 
proposals are delayed or destroyed? The costs of IRBs are 
immediately obvious and obviously large. The marginal benefits 
could be great but may well be small. And there must be cheaper 
means of achieving the goal. 
Consider another centerpiece of bioethics-informed consent. 
The seminal case of Canterbury v. Spence blandly (but quite 
typically) instituted a new legal regime of informed consent without 
betraying a drachma's worth of interest in whether its gains 
justified its costs. And who asks whether the prolonged and 
extensive effort to promulgate living wills is worth the candle? In 
short, it is a poor policy discipline that is more devoted to extending 
principles to their logical conclusions than to finding the right 
balance among conflicting goods and the right distribution of social 
costs, yet bioethics is that discipline. 
Bioethicists ignore these questions partly because they 
believe-more or less explicitly-that cost-benefit analysis is wrong. 
This belief seems to have two bases. First, bioethical programs 
serve such ineffable goals that it would be wrong to think of them in 
economic terms. This may be what the Department of Health and 
Human Services had in mind in its rationale for its ruinous HIPAA 
regulations. HHS grudgingly conceded that the "costs and benefits 
of a regulation must, of course, be considered as a means of 
identifying and weighing options." But in the same paragraph HHS 
warned that, because privacy is a "fundamental right ... it must be 
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viewed differently from any ordinary economic good."5 Here 
bioethicists are poorly served by the grandiosity of the terms in 
which they peddle their proposals. How can you criticize, much less 
abandon, a program, however expensive, that purports to enhance 
human rights? What is money compared with human dignity? The 
problem, of course, is that so many programs can be justified in 
similarly grand terms that we cannot possibly afford them all. The 
issue is not whether to pursue lofty goals; it is how to pursue them 
efficiently so that we can husband our resources for the many lofty 
calls made on them. And no goal, however worthy, justifies 
ineffective programs. 
The second bioethical objection to cost-benefit analysis seems to 
be that it works badly. There is much in this criticism, to be sure. 
Benefits and costs are hard to measure, since they are often diffuse 
and sometimes hard to monetize. But this does not mean that no 
insights can be gained by careful and clever attempts to weigh costs 
and benefits. And what is the alternative to such analysis? Policy-
making unable to eliminate even the most outrageous expenses and 
ineffective programs is doomed to foolishness and fatuity. Finally, if 
bioethicists really believe that the costs and benefits of programs 
cannot ever be intelligently assessed, surely they should doubt their 
ability to understand the world well enough to write regulations for 
it in the first place. The difficulty of cost-benefit analysis should be 
a constraint on law-making, not carte blanche. 
If we are to assess the costs and benefits of bioethical programs, 
we need to identify their goals. These are numerous, but if we 
reflect on the (very central) aspects of bioethics that deal with the 
patient, 6 one fact stands out: at the heart of bioethics and bioethical 
policy has been the effort genuinely to confide decisions to patients 
and genuinely to equip patients to make them competently. This is 
the summum bonum of the bioethical agenda in area after area. 
For example. Most medical decisions involve contemporary 
treatment decisions for competent patients, and the centerpiece of 
bioethical policy-informed consent-has generally been expected to 
equip patients to make their own decisions about how to be treated 
and whether to participate in research. So powerful has that idea 
been that, for example, it has in only a few decades obliterated 
ancient ideas about treatment at the end of life. Thus assisted 
suicide has gone in my lifetime from being unthinkable to being 
taken seriously as a constitutional right, becoming law in one state, 
and nearly becoming law in several others. 
5. Department of Health and Human Services, Standards for Privacy of 
Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Federal Register 82462, 82464 
(2000). On the regulations, see Carl E. Schneider, HIPAA-cracy, Hastings 
Center Report 11 (January/February 2006). 
6. Another shorthand term. I include in it anyone who must make a 
decision about receiving medical attention, not least a research subject. 
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More recently, bioethical policy has sought to extend the 
authority of patients by permitting them to make decisions in a 
competent today for an incompetent tomorrow, through advance 
directives. And when contemporaneous medical decisions must be 
made for formerly competent patients, bioethical policy has largely 
wanted surrogates to try to duplicate the decision the patients 
would have made. 
Even bioethical policy about reproduction has been based on 
views about the moral and constitutional significance of the 
pregnant woman as decision-maker. This was (apparently) at the 
core of Roe v. Wade. And even critics of that case sometimes adopt 
the language of decision. Thus some states have tried to specify 
information women seeking abortions must be given about fetal life 
and alternatives to abortion. 
Another kind of medical decision is currently becoming 
prominent-"consumer-directed health care." As health-care 
financing recalcitrantly continues to puzzle us, as managed care 
stubbornly seems to disappoint, lustrous hopes are cherished that 
all will finally be well if decisions can be transferred to patients. If 
only patients can purchase health insurance adapted to their wants 
and make cost part of their treatment decisions, will they not get 
better care at saner cost?7 
In sum, bioethical policy has centrally aimed at confiding more 
and more medical decisions to more and more kinds of patients in 
more and more kinds of ways. But bioethical policy has not just 
sought to provide patients with the authority to make decisions; it 
has also labored to assure them the wherewithal-especially the 
information-to make decisions wisely: Patients' consent to 
treatment and participation in research is supposed to be informed. 
The PSDA demands that patients be told about advance directives. 
HIP AA requires that patients be elaborately notified of privacy 
policies. Ambitious provisions are being made for supplying 
information to purchasers of health plans and medical care. And so 
on. 
Bioethics, in short, has a core agenda of some coherence. How, 
then, if we evaluate bioethics by assessing not the merits of the 
principle it professes but the success of the policies it promotes? 
What are the fruits of the program to equip patients to make the 
health-care decisions that affect them? It is through this question 
that I propose that we re-examine bioethics. The best way to refresh 
bioethics is not to grope for a new organizing principle, but rather to 
assess the content and consequences of bioethics' agenda. If that 
agenda is succeeding, bioethics need not be reconceived. If that 
agenda has largely failed, we will have added reason to reconceive 
7. For a good review of these developments, see Mark A. Hall, Paying for 
What You Get and Getting What You Pay For: Legal Responses to Consumer-
Driven Health Care, 69 Law & Contemporary Problems (forthcoming 2006). 
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bioethics, have evidence about the sources of bioethics' weaknesses, 
and have hints about directions for a new bioethics. If a new 
bioethics is necessary. And possible. 
II. THE F AlLURE OF THE AUTONOMY POLICY: 
SAMPLING THE EVIDENCE 
For which of you, intending to build a tower, sitteth not down 
first, and counteth the cost, whether he have sufficient to finish 
it? Lest haply, after he hath laid the foundation, and is not 
able to finish it, all that behold it begin to mock him .... 
Luke 14:28-29 
At this point, I confront a problem: I anticipate that evaluating 
the success of bioethical policy will identify such crushing problems 
that a new agenda might emerge from the inquiry. But we can't be 
sure until the evaluation is done. That will take many years and 
much effort, if it happens at all. So why should we think the inquiry 
will justify its costs and engender new understandings of bioethics? 
The short answer: There is already evidence that a perilously large 
part of the bioethical agenda has fallen intolerably and irremediably 
short of the expectations that inspired and would justify it. In this 
little essay I can hardly begin to touch on the (truly) thousands of 
relevant studies; they will be surveyed in the book I am writing. So 
for now, a few woefully abbreviated examples. 
A. Informed Consent 
And truly it demands something godlike in him who has cast 
off the common motives of humanity and has ventured to trust 
himself for a taskmaster. High be his heart, faithful his will, 
clear his sight, that he may in good earnest be doctrine, society, 
law, to himself, that a simple purpose may be to him as strong 
as iron necessity is to others! 
Ralph Waldo Emerson 
Self-Reliance 
Consider first informed consent, perhaps the oldest and most 
basic legal implementation of bioethical principles. What would it 
take for informed consent to equip patients to make medical 
decisions adequately? First, doctors would have to give patients 
information. Second, patients would have to hear, understand, 
remember, and assimilate the information. Third, patients would 
have to analyze the information critically and insightfully. Alas, the 
evidence mauls the long-nurtured hopes about each of these points. 
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1. Informing Patients 
The first requirement of informed consent is that doctors inform 
patients. Do they, after all these years? The evidence is 
disheartening. Braddock et al8 recently studied discussions between 
doctors and patients, looking particularly at "(1) the patient's role in 
decision making, (2) the nature of the decision, (3) alternatives, (4) 
pros (benefits) and cons (risks) of the alternatives, (5) uncertainties 
associated with the decision, (6) an assessment of the patient's 
understanding of the decision, and (7) an exploration of the patient's 
preferences." In a nutshell, "the completeness of informed decision 
making was low.... [F]ew decisions (9.0%) met criteria for 
completeness of informed decision making. Completeness of 
discussion of decisions varied by decision complexity. Whereas 
17.2% ofbasic decisions were complete, none ofthe intermediate and 
only 1 (0.5%) of the complex decisions were complete." 
Variation was considerable: "Patients were often told the nature 
of the intervention (basic, 66.1 %; complex, 83.9%), but there was 
seldom discussion of alternatives (5.5%-29.5%), pros and cons (2.3%-
26.3%), or uncertainties associated with the decision (1.1 %-16.6%). 
Physicians occasionally discussed the patient's role in decision 
making (5%-18.4%) and elicited patient preferences (17.8%-27.2%). 
Physicians rarely explored whether patients understood the decision 
(0.9%-6.9%)." The only good news was that generally, the more 
complex the decision, the more thorough the discussion. "The most 
striking increases were in alternatives (5-fold increase), pros and 
cons (10-fold increase), and uncertainties (16-fold increase). 
Discussion of the patient's role, discussion of the nature of the 
decision, and ascertainment of patient preference also showed 
significant increases from basic to complex categories .... " 
2. Understanding Information 
Even if doctors somehow informed patients thoroughly, patients 
would have to understand what they are told. Here, the data are 
also dismaying. Ponder the Herz study of 106 patients facing 
"routine neurosurgical procedures."9 Twenty-two of them 
"underwent anterior cervical discectomy and interbody spinal fusion 
procedures, and 84 underwent lumbar laminectomies." Patients 
were educated in three stages (that were apparently developed "in 
collaboration with a doctoral level lay educator"). First, the 
physician explained "the spinal anatomy and physiology," the 
procedure, the "reasons for considering surgery," the surgical 
techniques, the non-surgical alternatives to the procedure, and the 
8. Clarence H. Braddock et al, Informed Decision Making in Outpatient 
Practice: Time to Get Back to Basics, 282 JAMA 2313 (1999). 
9. David A. Herz et al, Informed Consent: Is It a Myth?, 30 Neurosurgery 
453 (1992). 
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"[o]perative goals and aspects of postoperative care." The surgeon 
used "printed materials and anatomical models" to make his points 
more clearly, he invited questions, and he asked patients to describe 
in their own words what they had learned. 
Second, patients and their families and friends were invited to 
an "education conference, performed by a Master's level nurse 
educator, covering the same topics." Like the surgeon, the nurse 
used visual aids, solicited questions, and tried to test patients' 
understanding orally. Third, patients spoke again with the surgeon. 
"There was further opportunity to ask questions and receive 
information regarding any perceived gaps in knowledge." 
Directly after meeting with the nurse, patients were tested on 
what they learned. When given multiple-choice questions, patients 
answered 53.1% of the questions correctly. Asked open-ended 
questions, patients' scores sunk to 34%. Better educated patients 
had higher scores than less well educated patients, but even 
patients "with graduate education" scored only 64.8% and 36.5% 
(multiple choice and open-ended, respectively). More particularly, 
scores on questions about the nature of the illness and details of the 
proposed surgery were 67% and 52%. Scores on questions about the 
risks of the surgery were 50% and 22.8%. Scores on questions about 
post-operative care were 26.7% and 43%. And scores on questions 
about the goals and benefits of the surgery were 35% and 26%. 
The Herz study investigates an exceptionally energetic, 
exhaustive, and exhausting attempt to inform patients, an attempt 
that could not be replicated in the ordinary clinical setting. Fischer 
et al describe a somewhat more realistic situation. 10 Physicians with 
a mean age of thirty-seven and a mean of 11 years of experience 
were asked to "discuss 'advance directives"' with some of their own 
patients (whom they had known for an average of two and a half 
years) who were either at least sixty-five or suffering from a serious 
illness. Only 70% of these conversations mentioned CPR. "The 
patients who had these discussions greatly overestimated their 
chances of survival after an in-hospital cardiopulmonary arrest." 
Their "median estimate of the probability of survival to hospital 
discharge was 70%, compared with a 20% median probability of 
survival stated by their physicians." There were "no significant 
differences in responses between patients" who had discussed CPR 
and those who had not when they were asked whether people 
usually need a ventilator after CPR. 
The bad news marches on: "Patients whose discussions included 
mechanical ventilation had a poor understanding of what this 
procedure entails, and a significant number harbored important 
misconceptions .... No [sic] subject who discussed ventilators had a 
10. Gary S. Fischer et al, Patient Knowledge and Physician Predictions of 
Treatment Preferences After Discussion of Advance Directives, 13 J General 
Internal Medicine 447 (1998). 
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good understanding of what they involved, and 50% had a poor 
understanding .... " Put this in perspective. "Fair understanding'' 
(a step up from "poor understanding'') is this: 
Interviewer: Do you know how it [ventilation] works to make 
you breathe? 
Patient: No .... 
Interviewer: What do you think it would be like to be on one? 
Patient: Oh, I don't want to be on one. 
Interviewer: OK. Do you have any idea what it might be like to 
be one? 
Patient: I don't know. 
Almost a quarter of the patients in this study already had an 
advance directive. One might hope that they would already know 
the relevant medical facts. But "[p)articipants who had previously 
written ADs did not have better knowledge of CPR or mechanical 
ventilation on any of these measures. In fact, those who had ADs 
were more likely to express the [false] view that ventilators directly 
kept the heart beating .... " 
In sum, Fischer et al conclude that "patients left the 
conversations with serious misunderstandings about CPR and 
mechanical ventilation." Did these patients perceive the 
unreliability of their knowledge and draw conclusions from it 
cautiously? No. Fischer et al comment that one "of the most 
disconcerting findings of this study was that patients expressed 
strong preferences about treatments that they did not understand." 
3. Analyzing Information 
Even if patients receive information and understand it, they 
cannot make good decisions unless they analyze it acutely. Here too 
the evidence is discouraging. Bioethicists have little troubled to 
understand how people make medical decisions. Dan Brock states a 
measured and moderate version of the standard assumptions. The 
physician gives the patient "facts about the diagnosis and about the 
prognoses without treatment and with alternative treatments." The 
patient provides "the values-his or her own conception of the 
good-with which to evaluate these alternatives" and selects "the 
one that is best for himself or herself."11 
This sounds straightforward enough, but the reality is 
hopelessly different, as decades of psychological research have richly 
11. Dan W. Brock, The Ideal of Shared Decision Making Between 
Physicians and Patients, 1 Kennedy Institute of Ethics J 28, 28 (1991). 
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shown. First, Brock's formulation assumes patients have "values" to 
supply, have beliefs that are coherent and considered enough that 
patients can deduce decisions from them. But people have better 
things to do than devising abstract principles for dreadful problems 
they hope will never arise. This is bad enough, yet the problem goes 
much deeper. For most of us much of the time, we find out what we 
value by observing and then justifying our choices. It is hardly too 
much to say that our "values" are the explanations we give for our 
decisions, not the source of them. So, Hibbard et al observe, much 
"research shows that preferences are remarkably labile and 
sensitive to the way a choice is described or framed."12 This suggests 
that people "may not have existing preferences or beliefs about self-
interest, but, rather, construct them in the process of deciding .... 
This new conception applies particularly to choices among options 
that are important, complex, and unfamiliar, like those consumers 
face in the current health care environment." As Richard Russo put 
it in my favorite academic novel (Straight Man), "The truth is, we 
never know for sure about ourselves .... [O]nly after we've done a 
thing do we know what we'll do .... Which is why we have spouses 
and children and parents and colleagues and friends, because 
someone has to know us better than we know ourselves." 
Second, the canonical view of bioethics not only assumes that 
people have reliable values to apply; it assumes that they reason 
effectively about how to promote those values. However, a 
substantial literature now catalogs the ways that human beings 
misperceive reality and employ short cuts and rules of thumb which 
may work well in familiar situations but which systematically 
malfunction in less familiar ones. Professor Sage summarizes some 
of that literature: 
[P]eople make striking and predictable errors when evaluating 
risks and either accepting, rejecting, or taking action to reduce 
them. These "cognitive biases" can be divided into "framing 
errors," which lead people to ignore actual probabilities and 
overestimate the likelihood of events that are familiar or 
salient, and "valuation errors," which induce people to overpay 
to avoid small, near-certain losses or lock in small, near-
certain gains, to live with significant risks that they 
mistakenly believe they can control, or to insist on eliminating 
minuscule risks of especially dreaded events. 13 
Thus, for example, people 
12. Judith H. Hibbard et al, Informing Consumer Decisions in Health Care: 
Implications from Decision-Making Research, 75 Milbank Quarterly 395, 402 
(1997). 
13. William M. Sage, Accountability Through Information: What the Health 
Care Industry Can Learn from Securities Regulation 12 (Milbank Memorial 
Fund, 2000). 
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consistently underestimate personal risk for hazards in certain 
situations: when the hazard is one with which individuals 
have had little personal experience; when hazards are 
perceived as low in probability; or when hazards are judged to 
be controllable by personal action. These types of hazards may 
include the potential for catastrophic illness, serious injury, or 
even less serious morbidities. This optimism bias in 
comparative riskjudgments is robust and widespread. 14 
The literature on how people generally and patients particularly 
make decisions is so complex that it can hardly be summarized here. 
To provide a better sense of the evidence, I will sketch one of the 
many problems in making medical decisions that bioethicists 
virtually ignore. Decisions require us to predict how we will feel 
about future states. And how well do we predict our own 
preferences? In brief, we struggle ineptly to predict our own tastes, 
behavior, and emotions even over short periods and under familiar 
circumstances. We make systematic mistakes in anticipating what 
we will enjoy. We regularly "miswant."15 
This seems horribly counter-intuitive. But hearken to a-quite 
incomplete-list of errors we make in forecasting our feelings: 
People mispredict what poster they will like, 16 how intensely they 
will relish yogurt, 17 which snacks they will prefer over the next three 
weeks, 18 how environmental changes will affect their well-being, 19 
how attached they will become to a free coffee mug,20 how distressed 
they will be on receiving the results of tests for HIV21 and for 
Huntington's disease,22 whether they will be happier living in 
Michigan or California, 23 how greatly they will enjoy a bicycle trip,24 
14. Judith H. Hibbard et al, Informing Consumer Decisions in Health Care: 
Implications from Decision-Making Research, 75 Milbank Quarterly 395, 401 
(1997). 
15. Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, Miswanting: Some Problems in 
the Forecasting of Future Affective States, in Joseph P. Forgas, ed, Feeling and 
Thinking: The Role of Affect in Social Cognition 178-79 (Cambridge U Press, 
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People Know What They Will Like?, 5 J Behavioral Decision Making 187 (1992). 
18. ltamar Simonson, The Effect of Purchase Quantity and Timing on 
Variety-Seeking Behavior, 27 J Marketing Research 150 (1990). 
19. George Loewenstein & Shane Frederick, Predicting Reactions to 
Environmental Change, in Max H. Bazerman et al, eds, Environment, Ethics, 
and Behavior (New Lexington Press, 1997). 
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how joyful Bill Clinton's election would make them,25 how gratified 
they will be to ace a test,26 how painfully criticism will wound 
them,27 how distraught they will be if their team loses,28 how 
agonizing a visit to the dentist and other tormentors will be,29 and, 
well, I could go on in this vein for some time. 
We not only mispredict our emotions; we mispredict our 
behavior. 
People go on dates planning to refrain from having sex, engage 
in foreplay with the expectation of using a condom at the next 
stage, and initiate sex with the plan to "interrupt" prior to the 
critical moment. As Gold found in interviews with gay men 
about their attempts to practice safe sex, however, such 
resolutions often break down in the "heat of the moment.',3o 
Profligacy is as unpredictable as passion: "[L]arge numbers of credit 
card users expect to maintain a zero credit balance but fail to do 
so .... "31 We can't even anticipate how much we will buy at the 
32 grocery store. 
Worse, pondering choices does not always improve predictions. 
Some of the people researchers instructed to pick a poster "were 
asked to think about why they liked or disliked each poster ('deep 
thinkers') and others were not ('shallow thinkers')." Perversely, "the 
deep thinkers were the least satisfied."33 And people asked "to 
predict how they would feel about the experience [of eating yogurt] 
over time [eight weeks] ... expected to like it less over time but in 
fact liked it more .... " But "[t]he most striking finding ... was the 
People Happy? A Focusing Illusion in Judgments of Life Satisfaction, 9 
Psychological Science 340 (1998). Living in California doesn't make you 
happier than living in Michigan. Sometimes I wonder about this one. 
24. Terence R. Mitchell et al, Temporal Adjustments in the Evaluation of 
Events: The "Rosy View," 33 J Experimental Social Psychology 421 (1997). 
25. Daniel T. Gilbert et al, The Trouble With Vronsky: Impact Bias in the 
Forecasting of Future Affective States, in L. F. Barrett & P. Salovey eds, The 
Wisdom in Feeling: Psychological Processes in Emotional Intelligence 114, 119-
20 (2002). 
26. Ibid at 120. 
27. Daniel T. Gilbert et al, Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in 
Affective Forecasting, 75 J Personality & Social Psychology 617 (1998). 
28. Timothy D. Wilson et al, Focalism: A Source of Durability Bias in 
Affective Forecasting, 78 J Personality & Social Psychology 349 (2000). 
29. George Loewenstein & David Schkade, Wouldn't It Be Nice? Predicting 
Future Feelings, in Daniel Kahneman et al, eds, Well-Being: The Foundations of 
Hedonic Psychology 91 (Russell Sage Foundation, 1999). 
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31. Ibid at 94. 
32. Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, Miswanting: Some Problems in 
the Forecasting of Future Affective States, in Joseph P. Forgas, ed, Feeling and 
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near-zero correlation between individual subjects' anticipated and 
actual reactions to the experience. Subjects' feelings did change 
substantially over time, but they had little idea, at the outset, about 
how they would change."34 
I have been describing failures to anticipate one's responses to 
events. These are partly failures to anticipate which reactions one 
will have. More commonly, they are failures to anticipate the 
intensity and the duration of one's reactions. These failures of 
anticipation have a common tendency-to over-estimate the 
intensity and duration of emotions. Your pleasure at the victory of 
your candidate on Tuesday is neither so profound nor so enduring as 
you expected on Monday. Indeed, "[t]he most prevalent error found 
in research on affective forecasting is the impact bias, whereby 
people overestimate the impact of future events on their emotional 
reactions. "35 
I have taken pains to describe one element of human reasoning 
in order to provide a better feel for my larger argument-that people 
reason in ways that bedevil the work of making medical decisions. 
But the bioethical view of human decisions is exceptionally naive. It 
is this naive view that makes possible much bioethical thinking. It 
allows bioethicists to believe that patients will make good decisions 
if they are given information about their choice of treatments, that 
people can anticipate their situation and preferences well enough to 
write useful living wills, that people reason so reliably that family 
members can replicate their decisions when patients are 
incompetent, and that we all can be made sagacious purchasers of 
medical insurance plans and medical treatments. And so we are in 
endless error hurled. 
4. Closing Thoughts on Informed Consent 
Can informed consent be made to do better? Probably, but not 
much. We've been trying hard for decades. Even determined and 
lavish efforts in favorable circumstances regularly fail. They fail 
because teaching and learning are much harder than bioethicists 
think. (Are their bluebooks really so much better than mine?) Nor 
is the problem merely local: Peter Schuck observes that similar 
problems 
appear in Canada, Europe, and Japan-countries whose 
organization of health care, political-regulatory structures, and 
professional culture and practices differ from ours in many 
34. George Loewenstein & David Schkade, Wouldn't It Be Nice? Predicting 
Future Feelings, in Daniel Kahneman et al, eds, Well-Being: The Foundations of 
Hedonic Psychology 88 (Russell Sage Foundation, 1999). Ice-cream eaters, on 
the other hand, accurately predicted that they would like it less over the eight 
weeks. 
35. Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective Forecasting, 35 
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 345, 353 (2003). 
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fundamental respects. The fact that similar discursive 
patterns are universal ... strongly implies that these patterns 
are so deeply rooted in the psychology and structure of a 
physician-patient relationship as to be largely immune to 
change through legal doctrine or other exogenous factors. 36 
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The evidence about informed consent is now several decades 
old. It is mountainous. It is damning. When failure is the norm, it 
is time to ask whether there are ineradicable reasons for the failure 
and time to go back to basics. 
B. Living Wills 
[An] exception to the doctrine that individuals are the best 
judges of their own interest, is when an individual attempts to 
decide irrevocably now what will be best for his interest at some 
future and distant time. The presumption in favor of 
individual judgement is only legitimate, where the judgment is 
grounded on actual, and especially on present, personal 
experience; not where it is formed antecedently to experience, 
and not suffered to be reversed even after experience has 
condemned it. 
John Stuart Mill 
Principles of Political Economy 
Another prominent item in the bioethics agenda has been the 
living will. Living wills have now been investigated at length and in 
detail. 37 They have failed and cannot be rescued: They seem not to 
affect the care patients receive. Even if they did, they would almost 
surely not increase the likelihood that patients would receive the 
care they wanted. This is not only what the evidence shows, it is 
what reason suggests. First, it is exceptionally difficult for patients 
to acquire information about the illnesses from which they might be 
suffering when incompetent, the treatments that might be available, 
and the consequences of the maladies and treatments. Second, 
patients can rarely survey all this information and then reach 
decisions about the treatment they would want that actually match 
the decisions they would have made if competent. Third, attempts 
to put preferences of the relevant kinds into accurate and useful 
words have persistently failed. Fourth, getting the living will to the 
right place has been harder than first seemed likely. Fifth, the 
living will must be relevant, read, and understood, requirements 
which are regularly frustrated. Sixth, the joker in the deck is that 
36. Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 Yale L J 899 
(1994). 
37. In this paragraph I draw on Angela Fagerlin & Carl E. Schneider, 
Enough: The Failure of the Living Will, Hastings Center Report 30 (March/April 
2004). 
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patients stubbornly resist writing living wills. 
Consider just one of the steps that would have to be taken to 
salvage the living will-doctors would have to give patients enough 
information for them to make good prospective decisions. 
Communication between doctors and patients about end-of-life 
decisions has been the subject of decades-long effort. And how, after 
all those years of adjuration does that communication actually 
occur? One spectacularly ambitious project-the SUPPORT study-
investigated over nine thousand gravely ill patients in five 
prominent teaching hospitals over four years. 38 Doctors were given 
reports on patients' prognoses and were told patients' feelings about 
CPR, treating pain, receiving information, and advance directives. 
Specially trained nurses promoted communication among patients, 
their surrogates, and their doctors. Succinctly, SUPPORT worked 
"no significant change in the timing of DNR orders, in physician-
patient agreement about DNR orders, in the number of undesirable 
days [patients experienced], in the prevalence of pain, or in the 
resources consumed." The experiment did not alter patients' 
preferences about DNR orders, their communication with doctors, or 
their satisfaction with their care. Only 15% of the doctors discussed 
the information they received with patients (or surrogates). In sum, 
despite a prodigiously elaborate and costly program, almost nothing 
budged. 
Let me give flesh to the statistical skeleton with a prominent 
doctor's horrifying description in a prominent magazine of how he 
"discussed" these issues with his patient: 
"Most people say that if they reach a point in the illness 
when their brain is impaired, and there is no likelihood of 
improving their quality oflife, then nothing should be done to 
keep them artificially alive, through machines like respirators. 
It's essential, Maxine, that I know what you want done if we 
reach that point." 
"I-I don't think I would want that," she said haltingly. 
"You mean that you would want only comfort measures to 
alleviate pain, and nothing done to prolong your life, like a 
respirator or cardiac resuscitation?" 
"Yes, I think so," Maxine whispered. 
38. SUPPORT Principal Investigators, A Controlled Trial to Improve Care 
for Seriously Ill Hospitalized Patients: The Study to Understand Prognoses and 
Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of Treatments (SUPPORT), 274 JAMA 1591 
(1995). 
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I nodded. This was her "end-of-life directive." I would put 
it in writing in her medical chart.39 
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This is how people decide to die? This is how a well-known 
physician didactically describes his own methods in a popular 
magazine? First, Groopman virtually strong-arms his patient into 
accepting the course he prefers. He is surely making a 
recommendation, but he never warns Maxine that that is what he is 
doing. He cloaks his recommendation in the ratification of "most 
people," but do "most people" say any such thing? Groopman's 
choice of words is tendentious. He speaks, for example, of being 
"artificially" alive. What does that mean? Is there such a category? 
What is more, when Maxine seems to be acquiescing, Groopman 
does not trouble to find out whether she understands his proposal. 
Worse, he closes the sale briskly by transmuting her tentative 
murmurs into final affirmations. Her first reaction to his proposal 
actually seems to be to contradict it. (All depends on what you think 
"that" refers to; grammatically, it could refer to refusing treatment, 
which she doesn't think she wants.) In any event, she speaks 
"haltingly," and she says only that she doesn't think she wants 
"that." Her second reaction is again phrased tentatively: she 
"whispers" that she thinks she agrees with him, which implies that 
she is not sure. But presto--behold the "end-of-life directive." 
Second, observe how radically vague this "end-of-life directive" 
is. It postulates a point when patients' brains are impaired and 
"there is no likelihood of improving their quality of life." How 
impaired? Many things impair people's brains without their 
wanting to die. Only egregious impairment ordinarily provokes 
that. But even "egregious impairment" gives scant guidance. 
Another crucial phrase in this living will is "no likelihood of 
improving" quality of life. Really? No likelihood? No chance? 
Physicians hate to say anything so absolute. But if not "no" 
likelihood, then what likelihood? And what treatments is she 
forgoing? Groopman speaks of "machines like respirators." What 
machine is like a respirator? Is Maxine objecting to being kept alive 
or to being kept alive by machines? 
Third, how much did Maxine understand about what was going 
on? The "directive's" words are, as I just argued, wretchedly vague. 
If Maxine is like most patients, she does not know what "a 
respirator or cardiac resuscitation" might mean. Most appalling of 
all, Maxine evidently had no idea she had just issued a binding 
"end-of-life directive." 
After all these years of advocating advance directives, is this 
where we are? If Maxine dies because treatment is withheld, it will 
be in the name of autonomy, and no questions will be asked. But 
39. Jerome Groopman, Dying Words, New Yorker, October 28, 2002, at 62, 
63. 
428 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
what is really going on here? Is all this just medical imperialism in 
new guise? Has Groopman heard so often that doctors overtreat 
patients at the end of life that he is determined it will not happen to 
his patients? Does Groopman actually believe that genuinely 
autonomous decisions are so easily come by? If it does nothing else, 
the story of Maxine should drive us to confront clearly and honestly 
what autonomy has come to mean and what it can realistically 
mean. 
But imagine a patient less vulnerable than poor Maxine and a 
physician more helpful than (adjectives fail me) Groopman. Imagine 
a healthy patient with time and resources to devote to writing a 
living will. And imagine that the patient had unfettered access to a 
communicative physician. How well would that patient's living will 
actually anticipate and communicate the decisions the patient would 
have made if competent? 
The problem, of course, lies not just in giving the authors of 
living wills accurate information and useful assistance. It also lies 
in patients' analysis of their choices and preferences. Recall now our 
discussion of the problems people have predicting their reactions to 
events and anticipating what will make them happy. If people 
mispredict their reaction to homely, common experiences, they will a 
fortiori misanticipate their reaction to the unfamiliar issues raised 
by living wills, especially to hypothetical choices and disturbing 
circumstances. Thomas Mann saw the problem: 
The pity the well person felt for the sick-a pity that almost 
amounted to awe, because the well person could not imagine 
how he himself could possibly bear such suffering-was very 
greatly exaggerated .... It was, in fact, the result of an error in 
thinking, a sort of hallucination; in that the well man 
attributed to the sick his own emotional equipment, and 
imagined that the sick man was, as it were, a well man who 
had to bear the agonies of the sick one-than which nothing 
was further from the truth. For the sick man was-precisely 
that, a sick man: with the nature and modified reactions of his 
state.40 
More particularly, people regularly fail to anticipate how illness 
and disability will affect them. Some of the most systematic 
evidence of this failure comes from comparisons between the way 
patients evaluate their lives and the way others evaluate those lives. 
Discrepancies in these evaluations are chronic. For example, "the 
general public estimates the health related quality of life (HRQoL) 
of dialysis at the value of 0.39 (on a scale where 0 represents death 
and 1 represents perfect health), whereas dialysis patients estimate 
their HRQoL at 0.56 .... Patients without colostomies estimate the 
40. Thomas Mann, The Magic Mountain 451 (H.T. Lowe-Porter trans., 
1968). 
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HRQoL of living with a colostomy at 0.80, while patients with 
colostomies rate their own HRQoL at 0.92."41 Similarly, "[i]n one 
study of 126 elderly outpatients with five common chronic 
diseases ... Pearlman and Uhlmann found that patients generally 
rated their quality of life to be slightly worse than 'good, no major 
complaints,' but their physicians rated their quality of life as 
significantly worse ... .'>42 The moral, of course, is that if people 
cannot even perceive how patients they know are currently handling 
illness, they cannot foresee how they themselves might someday 
react to it. 
In sum, the evidence about the living will closely resembles the 
evidence about informed consent. In both cases, there is much 
reason to doubt that patients receive enough sound information to 
make good decisions, that they satisfactorily understand the 
information they do receive, or that they analyze it with the acuity 
they themselves would wish. And in both cases, there is little 
reason to believe that any of these deficiencies can be adequately 
remedied. 
C. Consumer-Directed Health Care 
The whole thing reminds me of the uncomfortable feeling I 
experienced when I first sought out investment advice . ... 
[F]inancial advisers, well intentioned and competent as they 
might have been, were all favoring their own financial 
instruments. I concluded that I had ... to take the high-level 
management of my investments into my own hands. 
Similarly, ... that's the only viable choice any patient has. If 
you look after your investments, I think you should look after 
your life as well. Investigate things, come to your own 
conclusions, don't take any one recommendation as gospel. 
Andy Grove 
Taking on Prostate Cancer 
The dernier cri in the ethics of health-care finance is "patient-
directed health care." The AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial 
Affairs proclaims that "patients have a responsibility to learn as 
much as they can about their choices of plans, including the exact 
nature of the different benefits packages and their limitations. 
Patients have a responsibility to make sure they know and 
41. Peter A. Ubel et al, Whose Quality of Life? A Commentary Exploring 
Discrepancies Between Health State Evaluations of Patients and the General 
Public, 12 Quality of Life Research 599, 599 (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
2003) (footnotes omitted). 
42. George Loewenstein & David Schkade, Wouldn't It Be Nice? Predicting 
Future Feelings, in Daniel Kahneman et al, eds, Well-Being: The Foundations of 
Hedonic Psychology 90, 92 (Russell Sage Foundation, 1999). 
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understand the terms of their own health care plan."43 The claim is 
that when people meet those responsibilities they will buy medical 
insurance, subscribe to health-care plans, and purchase medical 
goods and services so astutely that they will get what they want at 
tolerable prices. 
Perhaps it is too soon to evaluate this gloriously optimistic 
proposal. However, minatory evidence is mounting rapidly. Here, 
as elsewhere in bioethics, the seeds of failure lie first in the 
difficulty of providing patients useful information. Only rarely do 
people comprehend even crudely "the information infrastructure on 
which the theory of competitive market and the theory of managed 
care rest." Some information about prices is even "jealously guarded 
proprietary information." Worse, information about "the quality of 
care is generally unavailable or not trustworthy. Not even the 
infection or complication rates experienced in hospitals are publicly 
known. Such information on quality as is made available in the 
media or on Web sites typically consists of mysteriously weighted 
aggregate indexes that obscure the detailed information patients 
would need in a competitive market.',44 
But, as usual, there are reasons useful information is not 
forthcoming. Not least, it is wickedly hard to put information in 
terms consumers can use. And as usual, honorable efforts have 
been made to tell patients what they need to know to make good 
purchases. For example, experiments with HMO "report cards" 
have sought to employ "several performance measures and plan 
characteristics to compare multiple plans." Thus "the Minnesota 
Health Data Institute distributed a 16-page, statewide report card 
that featured comparison tables and color-coded graphs of consumer 
satisfaction within categories of health plans and compared 38 plans 
based on 20 performance measures." However, "less than half of 
those seeing the report thought it was helpful for deciding on a plan. 
Consumers found the report cards cumbersome, complex, and 
detailed."45 
Even precise and complete information is useless if it is 
misunderstood. People read information through the prism of their 
own knowledge. And their knowledge about the market for health 
care is sadly distorted. For example, 30% of those surveyed in one 
study "knew almost nothing about HMOs.'' Of the remaining 
patients, "only 16 percent had adequate knowledge (scores of 76 
percent or higher) to choose between traditional Medicare and an 
43. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, 
Ethical Issues in Managed Care, 273 JAMA 330 (1995). How many physicians, 
much less patients, meet this standard? 
44. Uwe E. Reinhardt, Can Efficiency in Health Care Be Left to the 
Market?, 26 J Health Politics, Policy & Law 967, 986-87 (2001). 
45. Judith H. Hibbard et al, Informing Consumer Decisions in Health Care: 
Implications from Decision-Making Research, 75 Milbank Quarterly 395, 396-
98 (1997). 
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HMO. More than 41 percent scored in the 'inadequate' range (scores 
of 50 percent or less) .... " Only a third of those remaining patients 
"understood how physicians are paid under a fee-for-service system, 
and only about 40-50 percent understood that HMO doctors may be 
paid on a capitation basis." In short, few "beneficiaries are well 
informed about their choices. Even those who use multiple 
information sources to learn about health plans often have less-
than-adequate knowledge.""6 
All this means, at best, that consumers generally lack, as 
Professor Sage writes, "baseline information that could provide 
context for required disclosure. Therefore, health care consumers 
can easily misinterpret even accurate data." In one study, for 
example, "potential enrollees regarded report card data showing 
high hospitalization rates of health plan enrollees for pneumonia as 
showing leniency in approving inpatient treatment rather than 
demonstrating failure to administer vaccinations.'"'7 
Decisions about buying medical care are enormously complex, 
and people's needs are enormously various. So people need 
mountains of information. But the more information you have, the 
harder it is to comprehend, remember, and analyze. Hibbard et al 
observe that "a large body of empirical work" suggests "that the 
integration of different types of information and values into a 
decision is a very difficult cognitive process." Partly, "people can 
process and use only a limited number of variables.'' This is true 
even of experts. Thus, a study of handicappers for horse races found 
that as "more information was used, confidence in the decisions 
went up. However, predictive ability was as good with 5 variables 
as with 10, 20, or 40 .... Further, the reliability of the choices 
decreased as more information was made available. That is, when 
individuals had more information, their ability to use it 
'consistently' declined.'"'8 If experts falter, what hope for you and 
me? 
Even if consumers are offered the information the "contract" 
view of regulation suggests they need, they will reject much of it. 
For example, not only are patients ·ill-informed about physician 
payment in managed care, "only about half say they want to know 
such details.'"'9 Even when people say they want information, they 
routinely ignore it. For instance, "most consumers who have 
comparative plan performance information do not use that 
information in making their enrollment decisions, although most 
46. Judith H. Hibbard et al, Can Medicare Beneficiaries Make Informed 
Choices?, 17 Health Affairs 181 (1998). 
4 7. William M. Sage, Accountability Through Information: What the Health 
Care Industry Can Learn from Securities Regulation (Milbank Memorial Fund, 
2000). 
48. Judith H. Hibbard et al, Informing Consumer Decisions in Health Care: 
Implications from Decision-Making Research, 75 Milbank Q 395 (1997). 
49. Sage, Accountability at 36 (cited in note 4 7). 
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say that plan quality is very important to them."50 
Patients have other problems in bringing themselves to consult 
systematic information. For one thing, such information is 
generally "sterile compared with people's emotional investment in 
health care." The measures used in systematic information "tend to 
emphasize disease states and the processes that prevent or treat 
them," but "consumers in focus groups show limited interest in or 
ability to interpret technical information divorced from their 
individual circumstances. Instead, ordinary people seem to prefer 
subjective, relational information from 'people like them' .... "51 Yet 
what is more notoriously misleading than the anecdote? 
Dr. Johnson famously called a second marriage the triumph of 
hope over experience. What can we call consumer-directed health 
care? Mter our travail with informed consent, after our frustration 
with living wills, why would anyone think that the problems of 
explanation, comprehension, and analysis will vanish when people 
are asked to purchase health insurance, health plans, and health 
care? 
Ill. MANDATORY DISCLOSURE 
The human understanding is not a dry light, but is infused by 
desire and emotion, which give rise to 'wishful science'. For 
man prefers to believe what he wants to be true. He therefore 
rejects difficulties, being impatient of inquiry; sober things, 
because they restrict his hope; deeper parts of Nature, because 
of his superstition; the light of experience, because of his 
arrogance and pride, lest his mind should seem to concern itself 
with things mean and transitory; things that are strange and 
contrary to all expectation, because of common opinion. 
Francis Bacon 
Novum Organum 
The evidence we have surveyed repeatedly demonstrates that 
equipping people to make good decisions about complex, foreign, and 
frightening issues is challenging far beyond the facile assumptions 
of the bioethical agenda. It is therefore critical that, when that 
agenda has been promoted through law, one device has been 
overwhelmingly called on-mandatory disclosure. The examples are 
familiar. Doctors must tell patients what they need to know to 
make medical decisions. Researchers must tell patients about the 
risks of participating in experiments. Hospitals must tell patients 
about advance directives. Doctors and hospitals must tell patients 
50. Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care "Patient Protection" 
Laws: Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 
Cornell L Rev 1, 70 (1999). 
51. Sage, Accountability at 35-36 (cited in note 4 7). 
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about their privacy regimes. "Virtually every bill . . . to regulate 
managed care devotes major portions to information disclosure and 
dissemination."52 The list goes on; I will not. 
Mandatory disclosure is a hoary regulatory technique. And why 
not, since it ought to work? Don't people making decisions need 
information, want it, and use it? Doesn't an irresistible array of 
arguments justify disclosure requirements? The moral rationale is 
that disclosure liberates people from the servitude ignorance 
creates. The prophylaxis rationale assumes that predators can be 
discouraged if they must warn their prey. The market rationale 
holds that the production and allocation of goods is best regulated 
through markets and that markets work best when purchasers 
know most. And the welfare rationale supposes that we enhance 
people's well-being giving them the information they need to 
organize their lives. 
Nevertheless, as we have seen, disclosure requirements in 
health law seem not to work as intended. Can they be fixed? Well, 
consider the many other areas of law that deploy them. Are people 
buying worthless stocks? Securities laws say, "Disclose!" Are people 
borrowing money at usurious rates? Consumer protection laws say, 
"Disclose!" Are people injured by things they buy? Products-
liability law says, "Disclose!" Are police bullying criminal suspects 
into waiving their rights? Miranda says, "Disclose!" Are people 
signing disadvantageous marital agreements? Family law says to 
the couple, "Disclose!" 
Do these disclosure requirements work? Their goal is to 
improve decisions. The baseline for evaluation, then, is the quality 
of the decisions people would make were there no disclosure laws. 
Crudely defined, success would mean improving decisions enough to 
justify the costs of the disclosure requirement to the government, 
disclosers, and recipients. 
This standard of assessment is heroically challenging to apply. 
However, I doubt it is often met. If disclosure requirements prosper 
anywhere, it should be in securities markets, since they are 
dominated by institutions which have reasons and resources to use 
the information corporations disclose. But even there, scholars 
cannot agree that corporations would disclose less were there no 
securities laws (since corporations have economic incentives to 
disclose information to investors) or that the disclosures that are 
made improve investors' decisions. 
Most other disclosure regimes look worse. For example, 
Miranda has "'little or no effect on a suspect's propensity to talk .... 
Next to the warning label on cigarette packs, Miranda is the most 
widely ignored piece of official advice in our society.' ... Not only 
has Miranda largely failed to achieve its stated and implicit goals, 
52. William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws 
and American Health Care, 99 Columbia L Rev 1701, 1707-08 (1999). 
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but police have transformed Miranda into a tool of law 
enforcement .... "53 Another example. While the evidence of failure 
is hardly uniform, "the efforts of researchers to prove by scientific 
means that on-product warnings are indeed effective to modify 
safety-related behavior in actual or simulated real-world 
applications have generally yielded disappointing results."54 
This hardly bodes well for mandatory disclosures in medicine. 
But perhaps we can understand more if we ask why disclosure 
requirements work badly. Principally, disclosure succeeds only if 
many onerous conditions are all met. Let us briskly survey eight of 
them. 
First, information must actually be provided. However, 
disclosers often have reasons to withhold it, if only because 
disclosures cost money and can compromise disclosers' interests. 
Furthermore, disclosure requirements are hard to enforce: They 
usually affect so many transactions that the law cannot supervise 
them well administratively, and people from whom information is 
withheld rarely are injured enough to make suits economically 
sensible. 
Second, the information disclosed must be the right 
information-relevant, true, clear, complete. However, even willing 
disclosers often not do not know what to disclose and how best to 
disclose it. For example, some safety warnings apparently make 
people less cautious, not more. Cigarette warnings seem to have 
helped convince Americans that the dangers of smoking are greater 
than they actually are. This might be all to the good. However, the 
young start smoking partly because they over-estimate people's 
ability to stop. This seems to call for another round of package 
disclosures. Yet you can't tell people everything, because that 
drowns them in more information than they can cope with. 
Third, the audience must receive-and thus must perceive-the 
information. But often the information is, and even must be, 
inconspicuous. Furthermore, 40 to 44 million Americans, or roughly 
one quarter of the US population, are functionally illiterate, another 
50 million are marginally literate, and many of the rest have trouble 
comprehending even modestly complex verbal and numerical data. 
Fourth, recipients must attend to the information they perceive. 
But recipients commonly fail to recognize the relevance and 
significance of information or think they already know all they need 
to. Thus, they are easily convinced that the trouble of grappling with 
information will not be repaid. So how do you seize someone's 
attention? One "of the most consistent findings in the literature ... 
53. Richard A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-
First Century, 99 MichL Rev 1000, 1013, 1021 (2001). 
54. Hildy Bowbeer & David S. Killoran, Liriano v. Hobart Corp.: Obvious 
Dangers, The Duty to Warn of Safer Alternatives, and the Heeding Presumption, 
65 Brooklyn L Rev 717, 757 (1999). 
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is that a consumer's responsiveness to warnings is strongly affected 
by perceived hazardousness." Those perceptions are influenced by 
too much, including "the overall appearance of a product, ... 
perceived controllability of the hazard and its harmful 
consequences, . . . a person's ability to imagine various ways in 
which an injury might occur while using a product, ... familiarity 
with the product, . . . level of education or a person's abilities of 
processing information, . . . and the presence, . . . salience, . . . and 
content of warnings." Alas and of course, "[m]ost of these factors are 
difficult to influence."55 
Fifth, people must understand the information. This requires 
the kind of analytic effort most of us resist. And rightly resist. AB 
Whitehead wonderfully said, "It is a profoundly erroneous truism, 
repeated by all copy-books and by eminent people when they are 
making speeches, that we should cultivate the habit of thinking 
about what we are doing. . . . . Civilization advances by extending 
the number of important operations which we can perform without 
thinking about them. Operations of thought are like cavalry 
charges in a battle-they are strictly limited in number, they 
require fresh horses, and must only be made at decisive moments."56 
But even when we reluctantly recognize that the cavalry should 
charge, we hate to bring out the fresh horses. 
Sixth, recipients must believe what they are told. But people 
scout information that does not fit their view of the world. 
Furthermore, recipients often have reasons (good and bad) to fear 
that disclosers are shaping information to serve their own interests 
and not the recipients'. (How many suspects believe what the police 
tell them? How many should?) Such attitudes make recipients all 
too prone to spurn even true and good information. 
Seventh, people must decide to use the information. But people 
regularly resist incorporating new information into decisions, if only 
because that demands still more labor. People must therefore be 
convinced that their effort will be repaid. Sometimes it is, 
sometimes it isn't. You can't know until you've tried. You can't 
know if trying is worth trying. 
Eighth, people must use the information intelligently. The 
woeful rarity of this even where you would expect it most is 
suggested by shelves of books with titles like Why Smart People 
Make Big Money Mistakes and How to Correct Them. Even 
experienced investors overvalue their own judgment, are sooner 
swayed by vivid than dry data, delusively imagine that new 
evidence confirms their earlier opinions, and are addled by the 
buzzing swarm of systematic faults in reasoning that befuddle us 
55. Monica Trommelen, Effectiveness of Explicit Warnings, 25 Safety 
Science 79 (1997). 
56. Alfred North Whitehead, An Introduction to Mathematics 41-42 (Oxford 
U Press, 1948). 
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all. And so, for a small but chastening example, "[d]uring the 
Internet frenzy, firms that announced that they were changing their 
name to include 'dot.com' experienced abnormal returns, regardless 
of whether the announcement coincided with a change in business 
plan."57 To put this crucial point differently, people's decisions often 
do not change, much less improve, with more information. 
But why do lawmakers so often choose disclosure requirements 
when evidence for their success is (at best) so elusive and (at worst) 
so damning? One answer is that the structure of most law-making 
does little to encourage assessments of disclosure rules. Those rules 
are commonly inspired by indignation over genuine problems, 
indignation inflamed by anecdote.58 Attention is directed to what is 
wrong and the imperative of change, not to the effectiveness of the 
law's means. Anyway, it seems obvious that disclosure works, and 
there is no easy way to test its effectiveness in advance. And law is 
made by just the people-the well-educated and well-situated-best 
able to take advantage of disclosures and most convinced they want 
them. 
Furthermore, disclosure may be the only kind of regulation 
available to the law-maker. For instance, courts can create a cause 
of action against doctors who do not disclose information to patients, 
but courts cannot establish an administrative apparatus to 
supervise disclosure or medical treatment. And delightfully, 
disclosure requirements cost lawmakers a pittance, since they shift 
the costs of regulation to the regulated entities. For example, the 
Patient Self-Determination Act added farthings to the federal 
budget, but it cost hospitals over $100,000,000 just to set up 
compliance programs.59 Finally, once disclosure rules have been 
implemented, courts have no resources for or-it must be said-
interest in reviewing their effectiveness, and Congress has moved on 
to other issues. 
At this point, I want to emphasize a feature of medical decisions 
that crucially affects all attempts to create a world in which patients 
make good use of medical disclosures. Most writing on patients' 
autonomy-judicial and academic-assumes patients yearn to make 
medical decisions but are thwarted by medical imperialism. How 
true is this? The studies reach a surprising and surprisingly 
consistent conclusion: While many patients say they want to make 
decisions, a very substantial number of patients say they do not. 
Two studies give a keener sense of the research. 
57. Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 
56 Stanford L Rev 1, 14 (2003). 
58. For a good description of a doleful example, see David A. Hyman, Drive· 
Through Deliveries: Is "Consumer Protection" Just What the Doctor Ordered?, 78 
North Carolina L Rev 5 (1999). 
59. Jeremy Sugarman et al, The Cost of Ethics Legislation: A Look at the 
Patient Self-Determination Act, 3 Kennedy Institute of Ethics J 387 (1993). 
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Ende and his colleagues60 found that patients do indeed want 
information. Thus, "the mean score for information seeking was [on 
a 0-to-100 scale] 79.5 ± 11.5." But patients were considerably less 
interested in making decisions: "On a scale where 0 indicates a very 
low and 100 indicates a very high preference for decision making, 
and 50 indicates a neutral attitude, the mean score for the study 
population was 33.2 ± 12.6." Furthermore, "as patients were asked 
to consider increasingly severe illnesses, their desires to make 
decisions themselves declined." 
Similarly, William Strull et al found that patients little yearned 
to make their own decisions: "[N]early half (47%) of patients 
preferred that the clinician make the therapeutic decisions 'using all 
that is known about the medicines' but without the patient's 
participation .... " A third "preferred that the clinician make the 
decision 'but strongly consider the patient's opinion.' Only 19% of 
the patients stated they wish to share equally with the clinician in 
making the decision, and 3% wished to make the decision 
themselves." Interestingly enough, physicians over-estimated 
patients' desire to make medical decisions: "In contrast to the 
patient preferences, in the large majority of cases (78%) clinicians 
believed that patients wanted to help make decisions. In only 22% 
of cases did the clinician think the patient wanted the clinician 
alone to decide."61 
. The Ende and Strull studies exemplify many others which 
conclude that, while patients largely wish to be informed about their 
medical circumstances, substantial numbers of them do not want to 
make their own decisions, or perhaps even to participate in those 
decisions in any truly significant way. Furthermore, the older 
patients are and the sicker they get, the more they shun medical 
decisions. Rather, they are willing to defer to doctors or family 
members.62 
The sturdy, stalwart strength of this reluctance is suggested by 
a fascinating inquiry from Ende et al. They asked doctors how they 
would want decisions made should they have an upper-respiratory 
tract infection, hypertension, or a myocardial infarction, all 
"diseases that fall within the realm of their professional expertise." 
Even doctors "preferred that their provider take the principal role as 
decision maker." The differences in the reluctance of doctors and 
patients to make their own decisions "were small." And when 
"physicians who actually were enrolled as patients were compared 
60. Jack Ende et al, Measuring Patients' Desire for Autonomy: Decision 
Making and Information-Seeking Preferences Among Medical Patients, 4 J 
General Internal Medicine 23 (1989). 
61. William M. Strull et al, Do Patients Want to Participate in Medical 
Decision Making?, 252 JAMA 2990 (1984). 
62. I survey this literature at tedious length in Chapter 2 of The Practice of 
Autonomy: Patients, Doctors and Medical Decisions (Oxford U Press, 1998). 
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with the regular patient population, in the setting of severe illness 
no significant difference was found." Finally, like patients, doctors 
became less willing to make their own decisions as their illness 
worsened. 63 
A similar pattern evidently appears in another kind of health 
decision-purchasing health care. This is specially important 
because "consumer-driven health care" is, as I said earlier, the latest 
incarnation of the hydra-headed autonomy monster. For example, 
when focus groups are shown the report cards that are intended to 
inform consumers, they "commonly respond that they find the 
information overwhelming and confusing and that they do not know 
how to use the lava flow of information to make a decision. Many 
say they prefer to have someone tell them which plan to choose."64 
This kind of response horrifies autonomists, who believe that if 
only people are dosed with enough "education" they will be prepared 
and prompted to make their own decisions and want to do so. 
However, Hibbard et al conclude that "even with extensive and 
high-quality education programs, a significant portion of 
beneficiaries will not be able to use the information to make 
informed choices." Among the reasons is that the "options are 
complex and require significant health care contextual information 
to understand them. Many beneficiaries will need one-on-one help 
to find their way to a satisfactory choice.'.ss 
The evidence I have surveyed powerfully suggests that the gulf 
between bioethical hopes for the autonomy principle and the actual 
consequences of bioethical policies is unbridged. But it must always 
be hard to show that the gulf is unbridgeable. I have adduced two 
kinds of evidence for that proposition. In earlier sections, I argued 
that the failure to bridge the gulf after decades of engineering 
suggests that the bridge simply cannot be built. In this section, I 
have argued that the failure to construct similar bridges in other 
regulatory areas gives us yet further reason to doubt that the bridge 
is feasible. 
IV. PERESTROIKA? 
Your education begins when what is called your education is 
over - when you . . . have begun yourselves to work upon the 
raw material for results which you do not see, cannot predict, 
and which may be long in coming - when you take the fact 
63. Jack Ende et al, Preferences for Autonomy When Patients Are 
Physicians, 5 J General Internal Medicine 506 (1990). The physicians were 
significantly less anxious for information than the patients. 
64. Judith H. Hibbard et al, Informing Consumer Decisions in Health Care: 
Implications from Decision·Making Research, 75 Milbank Quarterly 395, 398 
(1997). 
65. Judith H. Hibbard et al, Can Medicare Beneficiaries Make Informed 
Choices?, 17 Health Affairs 181, 192 (1998). 
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which life offers you for your appointed task. No man has 
earned the right to intellectual ambition until he has learned to 
lay his course by a star which he has never seen - to dig by the 
divining rod for springs which he may never reach. In saying 
this, I point to that which will make your study heroic. For I 
say to you in all sadness of conviction, that to think great 
thoughts you must be heroes as well as idealists. 
Oliver Wendell Holmes 
The Profession of the Law 
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At the heart of the bioethical agenda has been the effort to 
transfer decisions to patients and to equip patients to make them 
wisely. The law has been recruited to promote many such transfers, 
primarily through mandated disclosures. But in area after area, the 
bioethical agenda and the law implementing it seem to have 
importantly failed, and no plausible reform of that law looks 
significantly promising. 
Grim as the evidence is, no amount of failure provokes 
bioethicists to wonder whether a specific proposal, the bioethical 
program, or the tools of bioethical regulation might be irredeemably 
flawed. Failure only drives them to add layer upon layer of 
Ptolemaic complexity. Were first-generation living wills laughably 
vague? Strive for completeness. Were second-generation living 
wills laughably complex? Solicit statements of"values." Were third-
generation living wills laughably opaque? Claim that they provoke 
conversations with physicians or families. Do physicians fail to talk 
with patients about care after incompetence? Educate them better. 
Do physicians fail to respond to education? Educate them some 
more, yea, unto seven times seventy. At some point, shouldn't 
repeated failure lead you to ask why your program is not working 
and whether it can ever work? 
As I have insisted to the point of ennui, in this essay I can only 
sample the evidence of failure. But if my sample is at all 
representative, bioethical programs, especially the law of bioethics, 
have failed so dramatically that bioethics should be fundamentally 
re-examined. What might that re-examination look like? Could it 
be profitable? 
The most constrained response to bioethical failure might be to 
adjust the standards of bioethical success. We might, for example, 
decide that patients should not be asked to make their own 
decisions, but rather should be satisfied with what one might 
pejoratively call ill-informed consent. Another constrained response 
would be to conclude that specific parts of the bioethical program 
are so hopeless that they should be abandoned altogether, even 
while retaining the rest. For example, Angela Fagerlin and I have 
made a systematic case that there is so little prospect that living 
wills can ever work that they should be abandoned, but we argue 
that a more modest device-the durable power of attorney-should 
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be retained (since it can help resolve questions of authority to make 
decisions for incompetent patients, presents patients a task within 
their competence, and costs little).66 
Perhaps the most radical response to the failure of so many 
bioethical policies would be to acknowledge that there is no a priori 
reason there must be a field of bioethics. If useful things cannot be 
said about bioethical issues, why slog on? Less radically, ifbioethics 
has little to contribute to the formulation of good policy, then it 
should be relegated to the work of theorizing until it has produced 
theories that intelligently guide policy. 
There may be a middle course. Once we have shown-if indeed 
it can be shown-that the central bioethical enterprise of confiding 
decisions to patients in some strong sense is doomed, we can ask 
whether there are other issues about which helpful things can be 
said and done. We could do this ad hoc, but I would attempt a 
modestly more systematic approach. 
I would start with the observation that bioethics' agenda largely 
comprises subjects bioethicists find intellectually interesting and 
ideologically agreeable. Bioethicists have offered patients what 
bioethicists think they want for themselves-autonomy and the 
ability to make medical decisions. Yet patients have in crucial ways 
rejected the bioethicists' gift. What, then, if bioethicists asked not 
what patients should want and instead asked what they do want? 
What would such a patient-centered bioethics look like? 
A quick clarification. One could review and expand the 
empirical literature about what patients say they want. But such a 
simple picture of patients' preferences could not be dispositive. 
Patients need not understand their interests better than anyone 
else: Patients are likely to have only a poor idea of what they might 
seek from a bioethical agenda because they have never thought 
systematically about the subject. But asking what patients 
experience, what patients want, and what gives patients satisfaction 
may provide illuminating (and sobering) insights into what the 
bioethical agenda is and should be. 
What principles might guide patients setting an agenda for 
bioethics? Patients presumably care naught about the intellectual 
fascination of issues. They care whether issues affect them, and 
they want to change the things that harm them. This suggests two 
criteria. First, bioethicists should concentrate on problems many 
patients encounter. Second, bioethicists should ask whether a 
problem lends itself to solution. 
When I ask patients what they want from their physicians, I 
usually receive two answers-competence and (in the broadest 
possible sense) kindness. The former issue deals with a classic 
problem in professional ethics-what level of skill and effort do 
66. Angela Fagerlin & Carl E. Schneider, Enough: The Failure of the Living 
Will, Hastings Center Report 30 (March/April2004). 
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professionals owe clients? The latter issue deals with a classic 
problem in the relationship of professionals and client-what kinds 
of interactions should clients hope for from professionals they hire? 
Both issues raise questions about the virtues physicians should 
study and practice. 
When we put these considerations together, a major bioethical 
topic like assisted suicide seems marginal because it affects so few 
people. On the other hand, bioethics might be led to a problem it 
has regrettably scanted:67 "The undertreatment of pain in the 
United States is well-documented in scientific literature." Studies 
"have demonstrated continued inadequacies in treatment (1) of 
those patient populations most likely to suffer from chronic and 
acute pain, including terminally ill patients, cancer patients, 
nursing home residents, elderly individuals, and chronic pain 
patients, and (2) in those medical environments where acute pain is 
routine, such as the emergency room, the post-operative unit, and 
the intensive care unit."68 
For example, one large-scale "study of seriously ill hospitalized 
patients [the SUPPORT study] demonstrated a high prevalence of 
pain. Half of the patients in this study complained of pain and one-
sixth reported extremely severe pain of any frequency or moderately 
severe pain occurring at least half of the time. Questioning 
suggested that pain was related to chronic conditions, as well as to 
the patients' acute illnesses and their treatment." This study "found 
clinically important levels of pain and dissatisfaction with pain 
control in all disease categories, including chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease and congestive heart failure, diseases that have 
not been traditionally associated with pain." While pain was 
virtually pervasive, some specialties failed more completely than 
others: "Surgeons' patients reported increased levels of pain 
compared with patients of other specialists. . . . Compared with 
oncologists' patients, patients of pulmonologists or intensivists were 
more dissatisfied with pain control."69 Even "five years after the 
67. In what follows, I will suggest that bioethics has under-examined 
several areas. In each of these areas, one can find some writing. But the 
question is not whether some articles can be located; it is whether a topic has 
been given the attention it deserves and whether it has received little attention 
compared with other bioethical topics. Pain is a good example. Admirable 
efforts have been made to address the problem. (See Sandra H. Johnson, 
Relieving Unnecessary, Treatable Pain for the Sake of Human Dignity, 29 J L, 
Medicine & Ethics 11 (2001), for a discussion of some of them.) Nevertheless, 
those efforts are slight compared with the severity of the problem and the 
oceans of writing on other topics. 
68. Amy J. Dilcher, Damned If They Do, Damned If They Don't: The Need 
for a Comprehensive Public Policy to Address the Inadequate Management of 
Pain, 13 Annals of Health Law 81, 83-84 (2004). 
69. Norman A. Desbiens et al, Pain and Satisfaction With Pain Control in 
Seriously Ill Hospitalized Adults: Findings From the SUPPORT Research 
Investigations, 24 Critical Care Medicine 1953 (1996). 
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completion of patient enrollment in SUPPORT" it appears that "pain 
control persists as a major problem for hospitalized patients. These 
patients are still in pain many months after their hospitalization 
and experience pain and other symptoms even on their deathbeds."70 
In short, the undertreatment of pain affects far more people 
than end-of-life issues like assisted suicide and even living wills. 
The problem not only afflicts horrifying proportions of dying 
patients, but millions of patients with undertreated chronic pain. 
And gratifying improvement can probably be made in ameliorating 
the problem: First, it is easier to change the behavior of physicians 
than patients. Second, we already are making progress. 71 
Or take another question of importance to most doctors and 
most patients: Even though an increasingly central fact about 
modern medical care is that it is delivered bureaucratically, 
bioethics has had little to say about the patient and doctor in the 
machine. Today, many of the ethical problems doctors (especially 
young doctors) confront raise issues of the ethical obligations of 
people operatin~ in organizations, not just issues of traditional 
medical ethics.7 And what are the ethical duties of medical 
organizations to their employees, their clients, and their society? 
Patients may also expect bioethicists to address another set of 
problems they have hardly embraced. Bioethics has recommended 
extensive changes in public policy, but it has scanted the ethical 
dilemmas individual human beings face when questions of health 
arise. Bioethics has routinely fobbed patients off with assurances 
that they are autonomous and will be guided by their own "values." 
Patients who want help thinking through their ethical obligations 
may generally look elsewhere. 
Some examples. (1) Bioethics has asked too infrequently about 
the morality of abortion in general or when abortion is morally 
permissible in a particular circumstance. (2) One of the largest 
ethical issues the baby-boom generation faces is what obligations 
adult children owe their enfeebled parents. Bioethics has barely 
edged into this subject. 73 (3) Bioethics has had strangely little to say 
about the value of human life and when it is legitimate to abandon 
70. Norman A. Desbiens & Albert W. Wu, Pain and Suffering in Seriously 
Ill Hospitalized Patients, 48 J American Geriatric Society S183, S185 (2000). 
71. There are differences among hospitals that suggest that noteworthy 
improvements in the treatment of pain are quite possible: "Patients at the worst 
performing hospital reported about 75% higher levels of pain than those at the 
hospital with the best performance. Anecdotally, at the best performing 
hospital, pain control had been a major emphasis for several years before the 
onset of SUPPORT." Ibid at S186. 
72. See, e.g., Daniel F. Chambliss, Beyond Caring: Hospitals, Nurses, and 
the Social Organization of Ethics (U Chicago Press, 1996). 
73. There are some good starts. See, e.g., Hilde Lindemann Nelson & 
James Lindemann Nelson, The Patient in the Family: An Ethics of Medicine 
and Families (Routledge, 1995). 
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it. ( 4) Bioethicists have written a good deal about whether and how 
the definition of death should be manipulated in order to increase 
organ donations, but they have been much less concerned to identify 
and examine any duty to donate. (5) Finally, serious illness 
confronts most patients with a moral crisis in which they must think 
about whether their lives have been worth living and how their lives 
can be made worthwhile in the throes of disease.74 With a few fine 
exceptions,75 bioethicists have not helped patients grapple with these 
issues. 
Patients will also be interested in the ethical distribution of 
medical resources. Bioethicists have of course paid some attention 
to rationing, but much work remains undone. The nature of that 
work is generally well known, but many issues have been virtually 
ignored. For instance, the primary device of bioethical policy-
mandatory disclosure-benefits the well educated and well situated 
far more than the illiterate and poor. Disclosures are more useful to 
the former than the latter because the former are better able to 
understand them and understand how to use them. Furthermore, 
bioethical reforms divert resources from providing medical services. 
The well-off need not mind this because they already have access to 
good services. Those who are not prosperous are less fortunate; for 
them the diversion is usually a foolish allocation of resources. 
This leads me to a final observation. Bioethics is about ethical 
obligations. But bioethics has a curiously narrow view of when 
people might owe each other duties. The obligations doctors and 
researchers contractually assume toward patients have been central 
to bioethics. But patients themselves think seriously about what 
they owe other people and about how they can live ethical lives. 
Bioethics has been so preoccupied with liberating patients from 
medical imperialism that it has hardly noticed the earnestness with 
which patients take their moral lives and obligations. No wonder 
we cannot adopt some system of health insurance, when we find it 
so difficult to think in terms of a duty to help other people.76 
I have argued that the crusade to put bioethical principles into 
law and policy seems to have failed in many serious ways. That 
failure has been little perceived and less discussed. In part, this is 
because bioethics has been unwilling to become an effective and 
ethical "policy science." That is, it has been loathe to think about 
realistic ways of implementing its policies, about its policies' costs, 
or about trade-offs among the goals of bioethics and other social 
74. I discuss this in Carl E. Schneider, The Practice of Autonomy: Patients, 
Doctors, and Medical Decisions (Oxford U Press, 1998). 
75. E.g., Arthur W. Frank, At the Will of the Body: Reflections on Illness 
(Houghton Miffiin, 1991); Arthur W. Frank, The Wounded Storyteller: Body, 
Illness, and Ethics (University of Chicago Press, 1995). 
76. See Lois Shepherd, Assuming Responsibility, 41 Wake Forest L Rev 445 
(2006). 
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goals in health affairs. 
But the problem is also political and ideological. The political 
crusade against medical imperialism and the ideological embrace of 
the autonomy principle are powerful forces, forces that tend to 
suppress reflection about and criticism of bioethics. But the problem 
goes deeper. The apparent failure of bioethical policies raises 
disturbing questions we would rather not think about. First, if 
those policies don't work, must we return to the bad old days of 
medical paternalism? Second, it is hard to review the failure of 
those policies without sounding elitist, without seeming to sneer at 
the people who have not managed to make informed and acute 
medical decisions for themselves. 
But this is what must make your study heroic. No one wants to 
return to the bad old days. And the failure of bioethical policies is 
not due to ignorant, stupid, and cowardly people. On the contrary. 
In my research among patients, I am always moved by the good 
sense, decency, and courage with which people suffering from 
dreadful illness live their lives. The problem lies not in the failings 
of some people; it lies in the limits of us all. 
Bioethics has found comfort in its traditional enemy and its 
organizing principle. It is not pleasant to contemplate rethinking 
bioethics without the help of a familiar foe and an established 
principle. But it is time to try. 
